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Using Taxes to Support Multiple Health Insurance Risk Pools
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

David Gamage is a professor of law at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law,
and Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on
SALT, the authors discuss Republican U.S.
Sen. Ted Cruz’s recent health insurance
deregulation proposal. They explain concerns
about the proposal and offer suggestions for
how states could continue to insure their
most vulnerable residents should the Cruz
proposal be enacted as part of healthcare
reform.
As we write, healthcare reform has been
declared dead – and risen from the dead – so
many times that we have run out of zombie
metaphors. We simply have no idea where we
will be in the process when this article is
published. We will nevertheless address a
reform proposal advanced by U.S. Sen. Ted
Cruz, R-Texas, because that proposal raises
some fundamental questions about the nature of
health insurance regulation in the United States.
As has been widely reported, Cruz has been

pushing a new health insurance deregulation
proposal.1 If enacted, Cruz’s proposal would
“allow insurers to sell individual-market plans
that don’t meet the [Affordable Care Act’s]
popular consumer protections—as long as they
offer at least one plan in the same market that
2
complies with those mandates.”
The proposal raises fundamental questions
about the nature of health insurance regulation
in the United States. In most markets, it is
considered desirable for consumers to have
more choices. Other areas of law and regulation
— such as antitrust law — are largely motivated
by the goals of promoting choice and
competition. But health insurance regulation is
different.
The ACA prevents health insurance
providers from denying coverage or charging
more to those with preexisting health
conditions. The health reform legislation that
was recently passed by the House of
Representatives — the American Health Care
Act (AHCA) — would maintain those
3
provisions. The version of that legislation that
the Senate has been considering — the Better
Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA) — would
4
likewise maintain those provisions.
Cruz’s proposal is different in that it would
allow insurance providers to offer plans that deny

1

See Harris Meyer, “Cruz Insurance Proposal Underscores
Trouble With Protecting Pre-Existing Conditions,” Modern
Healthcare (June 30, 2017).
2

Id.

3

For our prior essays analyzing the AHCA, see David Gamage
and Darien Shanske, “The American Health Care Act Would Toss
the States a Hot Potato,” State Tax Notes, May 8, 2017, p. 579; and
Gamage and Shanske, “How States Can Respond to the AHCA:
Using the McCarran-Ferguson Act,” State Tax Notes, July 24, 2017, p.
367.
4

For discussion, see Margot Sanger-Katz, “Ted Cruz Has an Idea
for How to Cover High-Risk Patients,” The New York Times, July 5,
2017.
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coverage or charge more to those with preexisting
health conditions — so long as each provider
offered at least one other plan that didn’t contain
those limitations.
It has long been understood by economists
and by other healthcare experts that simply
preventing insurance providers from denying
coverage or charging more to those with
preexisting health conditions can create adverseselection death spirals for the insurers.5 The
danger is that healthier people might choose to
purchase health insurance plans that provide
better everyday benefits but worse coverage for
expensive health conditions. Alternatively,
healthier people might choose to forgo
purchasing health insurance altogether.
Either way, that would leave insurance plans
that offer good coverage for expensive health
conditions with a sicker and more costly pool of
insureds. To compensate, those plans would need
6
to raise prices for all insureds, but that would
further drive away healthier people, making the
remaining pool of insureds even sicker and
costlier, leading to further price increases, and so
on.
In other words, giving consumers more
choices when it comes to health insurance can
result in the market collapsing — leaving the
sickest and most needy consumers without any
good choices.7 It should come as no surprise then
that Cruz’s proposal has been widely criticized for
threatening health insurance risk pools. By giving
healthier consumers the choice of purchasing
plans that are better for them — at least so long as
they remain healthy — Cruz’s plan would
threaten to undermine the coverage options
available to sicker consumers.
That Cruz’s proposal would require health
insurers to offer at least one plan that complies
with the ACA’s consumer protections is of little

5

See Gamage, “Perverse Incentives Arising From the Tax
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are
Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income
Workers,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 669, 676-679 (2012).
6

That is because the plans are forbidden from increasing prices
only for sicker and more costly insureds.

help in that regard. Because healthier people
could be expected to opt for the noncompliant
plans, the pool of insureds interested in
purchasing the compliant plans would become far
sicker and costlier, resulting in insurance
providers charging high prices for those plans.
By contrast, under the ACA, the healthcare
exchanges were designed around maintaining a
single exchange-based risk pool. Of course,
employer-sponsored insurance plans were
understood to be outside that single exchangebased risk pool because employer populations
were thought to be sustainable risk pools of their
own, at least for large employers. But the ACA’s
marketplace regulations were designed to
prevent non-employer plans from undermining
the single exchange-based risk pool. Again, Cruz’s
plan would threaten that regulatory framework.
One problem with how the ACA’s regulations
maintain the single exchange-based risk pool is
that in doing so, those regulations limit the
potentially positive aspects of consumer choice
8
and provider competition. That is because health
insurance providers have limited ability to design
innovative new policies that might be more
attractive overall, because those providers must
comply with the ACA’s regulations that are meant
to prevent adverse selection.
Put another way, there is a tension between
limiting adverse selection in health insurance, on
the one hand, and fostering innovation through
market incentives, on the other. The ACA’s
framework limits adverse selection but also limits
innovation. Might there be a way for us to have
our cake and eat it too? Could reforms limit
adverse selection while also fostering more
innovation through market incentives? Our
tentative answer is yes.
We will now explain how a modified version
of Cruz’s proposal could leave greater scope for
innovation while still limiting adverse selection.
One option would be for the federal government
to commit to offering sufficient subsidies for those
who purchase compliant plans, so that sicker
individuals would not be priced out of the
market. However, the cost of such subsidies

7

For a more in-depth discussion of a similar dynamic outside
the health insurance context, see Gamage and Allon Kedem,
“Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing the
Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations,” 73 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1299, 1343-1347 (2006).
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See John H. Cochrane, “After the ACA: Freeing the Market for
Healthcare,” June 2014.
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would be very large. In any case, that is not part of
Cruz’s proposal.9
Consider another potential modification to
Cruz’s plan. Rather than the federal government
undertaking to provide subsidies for compliant
plans using general revenue, the federal
government could instead tax noncompliant
plans and then use the revenue to subsidize
compliant plans. Those subsidies could either be
in the form of direct payments to compliant plans
(to reduce premiums) or in the form of tax credits
made available to individuals and families who
purchase compliant plans (to make those plans
more affordable after tax).
Ideally, the size of those taxes and subsidies
would be readjusted annually, with the size of the
taxes and subsidies set to approximate the cost of
complying with the ACA’s consumer protections.
Put another way, the size of the taxes and
subsidies should be set to approximate the
externality that noncomplying plans impose on
complying plans through adverse selection.
With that new proposed regulatory
framework in place, health insurance providers
would have greater freedom to devise innovative
health insurance offerings. Any such offering that
served the public good by creating more value for
consumers than costs in the form of adverseselection externalities to compliant insurance
plans should be profitable for the insurance
provider even after the state-level taxes and
subsidies. But plans that innovated only to drive
away sicker insureds should not be profitable
after the taxes and subsidies.
Of course, that modification would require
that the federal government impose a large new
tax and provide large subsidies. Again, that is not
part of the Cruz plan. But, were the Cruz plan to
be adopted, a state government could then adopt
this approach. In other words, a state government
could impose a tax on noncompliant plans to force

them to internalize the cost of driving away sicker
insureds.
Were a state government to do so, under the
current federal regulatory framework we would
recommend that the state government use statelevel tax credits for purchasing compliant plans
rather than direct payments to compliant plans.
That is for two major reasons. First, to the extent
desired by the state government, those tax credits
could be scaled to income to provide more benefit
to the state’s low-income citizens. Second, using
subsidies to reduce the premiums charged for
exchange-based plans would result in a state’s
citizens receiving smaller tax credits from the
federal government. By contrast, providing
additional state-level tax credits would not reduce
the pretax price of the premiums for compliant
exchange-based plans. Thus, that approach
would not reduce the size of the federal tax credits
available to a state’s citizens.
There is an interesting analogue to our
proposal already being used at the state level. In
the realm of education finance, there is a tension
between the supposed efficiency and democratic
accountability of local control versus the
inequities that result from local control in a world
where wealth is unevenly distributed. Ultimately,
all states aim to strike a balance between those
competing considerations, primarily through
their tax systems. Sometimes the balance is
explicit, as in Texas’s “Robin Hood” system,
whereby wealthier school districts can provide
more funding for themselves but must also pay
into a fund for poorer districts.10 In other states,
the state provides a foundation level of funding
for all school districts using general tax dollars
that individual districts can supplement with
11
local taxes.
States could approach health insurance
regulation in a similar way if confronted by
something like the Cruz proposal. On the one
hand, under the Cruz proposal, the federal

9

The BCRA would continue to offer subsidies to some poorer
consumers in order to purchase compliant plans, but those
subsidies would be smaller relative to the ACA, as would the
number of consumers eligible for those reduced subsidies. See
Karen Pollitz and Anthony Damico, “Uneven Playing Field:
Applying Different Rules to Competing Health Plans,” Kaiser
Family Foundation. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that
there would be 6.1 million individuals who would not receive any
credits under the BCRA, but who had under the ACA. Of these, the
foundation estimated that about 1.5 million have preexisting
conditions and thus would face extremely high premiums. Id.

10

That is a rough approximation of a complicated system with
many options. For the law, see Texas Education Code chapter 41.
See also, Texas Association of School Boards, “Overview of the
School Finance System,” Financial Responsibility Guide (2016).
11

That is also a rough approximation. For a more precise
overview, see Deborah A. Verstegen, “How Do States Pay for
Schools? An Update of a 50-State Survey of Finance Policies and
Programs” (2014).

STATE TAX NOTES, AUGUST 28, 2017
For more State Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

873

© Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT

government would allow those well-off (in health,
wealth, or youth) to benefit from being able to
purchase health insurance plans better tailored to
their needs. That tailoring could be because of
either socially beneficial innovation or the health
plans cutting benefits for the sickest insureds
while increasing benefits for the relatively
healthy. By taxing noncompliant plans while
providing tax credits to fund the purchase of
compliant plans, state governments could
counteract the incentives and social costs for
insurers to take the second strategy.
Of course, state governments will not be able
to strike that balance perfectly, no matter how
well the taxes and subsidies are designed. One
potential advantage of leaving the design of taxes
and subsidies to state governments is that each
state government could attempt to strike that
balance based on its specific conditions and policy
preferences.
More generally, we think health reform could
benefit from more developed thinking about how
state governments might play a useful role in
concert with the federal government. However,
understanding state taxing capacities and fiscal
federalism will be essential for such thinking to
bear fruit. We thus hope to continue to explore the
intersections of health reform and state and local
taxation in future scholarship, and we hope others
will join us in this effort.
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